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Abstract
We show that the entry of a second rm in a horizontally di¤erenti-
ated market (ala Hotelling) may harm consumers as prices increase and
consumers surplus possibly decrease. We rst derive the price and the
consumers surplus of a monopoly which is located at the center of the
market. When a second rm enters the market the rst rm repositions
and the two rms locate at their equilibrium points. Although compe-
tition adds to variety and increases consumers surplus, the post entry
increase in price may outweight the gains from extra variety and make
consumers worse o¤.
JEL Classication: L13, D43, D60
Keywords : Horizontal di¤erentiation, welfare analysis, product repo-
sitioning
1 Introduction
We examine the e¤ects of repositioning on prices and consumers surplus from
the entry of a second rm on a horizontally di¤erentiated market. Repositioning
may take the form of a change in the physical location where the product is
o¤ered: When a second rm decides to sell a di¤erentiated product through
a supermarket chain, the incumbent is posible to relocate its product on the
shelves of these supermarkets in an e¤ort to minimize the consequences of the
entry on its sales. Repositioning may also take the form of relocation in the
product space: A number of various reasons such as a change in demographic
parameters, demand shocks or mergers may make rms to change the physical
characteristics of their products. An example of successful repositioning in the
face of competition is the response of MSNBC to Fox News. As Fox Channel
I would like to thank George Deltas, Paolo Garella and Konstantinos Serfes for their
comments. I am responsible for any remaining errors.
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solidied over time its hold of the right-wingpart of the viewing spectrum,
MSNBC repositioned itself as the liberal alternative. Sweeting (2007) estimates
the costs and revenues associated with the format switching in the broadcast
radio industry. He nds that repositioning raised Hispanic listening by over
20%, as stations entered Spanish-language formats in many markets.
We consider a market in which consumers are located on a Hotellings line.
Post entry, the incumbent which originally is located at the center of the line,
relocates and the two rms locate at their equilibrium locations. We show that
the entry of a second rm may harm consumers as it may decrease consumers
surplus. We know that competition adds to variety, and thus increases con-
sumers surplus. On the other hand under certain conditions the duopoly price
may exceed the monopoly price. We show that there are parameter values for
which the price increase outweights the gains from extra variety and the con-
sumers surplus decreases. The e¤ect of competition on price is the result of two
factors. The demand in duopoly is much steeper than the demand in monopoly:
As the monopoly locates at the center of the market, when it lowers its price
from the equilibrium price , the quantity demanded increases on both ends of
the market. When a duopoly rm unilaterally and marginally lowers its price
from the equilibrium level, the demand for its product does not increase on the
end point and the number of consumers switching from the other rm is small.
Thus, such rm has an incentive to raise its price above the monopoly price.
On the other hand, as a duopoly rm sells to fewer consumers its elasticity
may be higher than the elasticity of the monopoly. In such case, the duopoly
rm has an incentive to set its price below the monopoly price.When the rst
e¤ect dominates the second, post entry prices increase. The result holds both
when post entry the two rms locate within the market quartiles (which occurs
when the transportation cost is linear, Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999))
and when the two rms locate outside the market quartiles (which occurs when
the transportation cost is quadratic, Chrico et. al (2003)).
The increase in prices as the result of intensied competition has been ex-
amined in spatial models of product di¤erentiation: Perlo¤ et al. (2005) show
that the entry of a second rm in a Hotelling type market will increase the price
if the two rms collude and may increase the price if the two rms compete
ala Bertrand. Chen and Riordan (2007) analyze a generalized Hotelling model,
the spokes model, and show that equilibrium prices can increase with entry.
Chen and Riordin (2008) present a general discrete choice model of product dif-
ferentiation and provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for price increasing
competition. In the above models, there is no relocation after the entry of the
second rm, as in the present paper. Furthermore, here we show that, post
entry, consumers surplus is possible to decrease.
Price increasing competition may hold as a result of imperfect information:
When consumers must search for the prices that rms charge, the presence of
more rms makes it more di¢ cult to nd the lowest price in the market. Con-
sumersincentives to search reduce and this can cause the equilibrium market
price to increase as the number of rms increase (Stiglitz (1987)). In Schultz and
Stahl (1996) imperfectly informed consumers search for the best variety. Retail-
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ers locate in the same shopping center. The greater variety of products attracts
more customers to the shopping center which might outweight the more intense
competition within the shopping center. Here, there is no search as consumers
have perfect information.
The result holds in markets with consumers belonging to a loyal group of
consumers and a switching group. As the number of sellers increase, the size of
the switching group per rm decreases, and its incentive to exploit the captured
consumers through a higher price increases. In Rosenthal (1980) the equilibrium
prices are in mixed strategies.1
This result has also been empirically documented in a number of horizontally
and vertically di¤erentiated markets: Goolsbee and Syverson (2006) show that
in the passenger airlines industry, competitors of Southwest Airlines raise route
prices when Southwest opens new routes to the same destination from a nearby
airport. Perlo¤ et al. (2005) show that new entry of di¤erentiated propriated
anti-ulcer drugs raises prices in that market. Thomadsen (2007) provides evi-
dence that prices may rise above the monopoly level with entry, in the fast food
industry. Furthermore, Caves et al (1991) and Grabowski and Vernon (1992)
provide evidence that the price of brand-name drugs in the U.S. increased after
the entry of generic drug products. This happens as brand name manufacturers
raise their prices to price discriminate when generics enter the market. Ward et
al. (2002) show that the entry of private-label food products tend to raise the
prices of name-brand products.
In independent work, Cowan and Yin (2008) show that welfare may decrease
with competition with the entry of a second rm when transportation cost is
linear. They assume that a monopolist is locating at the one end of the Hotelling
line, while in duopoly the new rm locates at the other end of the line. Thus,
they implicitly assume that there is no option of locating at an interior point
within the line. However, Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999) show that in
this case the equilibrium locations for the two rms will be within the markets
quartiles. Here, we consider the equilibrium locations for the two rms with
linear and quadratic transportation cost and we compare them with a monopoly
that is located at the center of the market space.
1.1 Linear transportation cost
We use the standard Hotellings (1929) duopoly model assuming that consumers
have a nite reservation price for the di¤erentiated product as Lerner and Singer
(1937). Consumers are located uniformly at the [0; 1] interval. For simplicity,
we normalize the total number of consumers to one. Each consumer buys one
unit of the good. Initially, there is only one rm in the market. The monopoly is
located at the center of the characteristic space (as this is the optimal location
for the monopoly) and maximizes its prots by setting its price PM . In this
section we assume linear transportation cost. The utility that a consumer, who
is located at point x in the line, gets from buying the product from the monopoly
1For a model of a similar avour, see also Zhou (2006).
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is:
U(x) = V   t
x  12
  PM :
All consumers with nonnegative utility buy from the monopoly.
Post entry, the monopoly relocates and the market can be described by the
standard duopoly model. Let now the two rms be A and B. Firm A is located
at xA and B at 1  xB . The price each rm sets is Pi, where i = A;B. The
utility that a consumer, who is located at point x in the line, gets from buying
the product from rm A, is:
UA(x) = V   tjx  xAj   PA;
and when he buys from rm B is:
UB(x) = V   tj1  xB   xj   PB :
A consumer located at x solves:
maxfV   tjx  xAj   PA; V   tj1  xB   xj   PB ; 0g:
where t is a positive real number which shows the unit transport cost. This
specication implies that strong preference for one rm results in strong aversion
to the other rm by a factor t. V is the reservation price, that is the maximum
price that a consumer who is located either at xA or 1  xB , is willing to pay for
the good. Furthermore, to facilitate the analysis we set  = t=V . Both rms
simultaneously determine where to locate and then simultaneously set their
price. Furthermore, the analysis focuses on pure strategy symmetric location
equilibria.
It is well known that when V is highrelative to t, there is no pure strategy
price-location equilibrium.2 For higher values of  we have two types of equilib-
ria. More specically, for 87   < 43 Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999) show
that we have competitive equilibria with full supply. In this case, the distance
between the two rms is less than 12 . Each rm serves half the market only.
Firms charge high prices and as a result the consumers at the endpoints of the
product space (at x = 0 and x = 1) have zero utility. As rms locate within the
markets quartiles, the marginal consumer at the center (x = 12 ) of the product
space has strictly positive utility. For 43    2 we have touching equilibria
with full supply. In this type of equilibria, the two rms locate at the markets
quartiles. Again, each rm covers half the market only. Firms set high prices,
so that and the utility of the consumers at x = 0; x = 1 and x = 12 is zero. For
 > 2 the two rms form two local monopolies and do not compete.3
We consider values of  for which the optimal price of the monopoly is an
interior solution. We derive the price, the consumers surplus and welfare of the
monopoly that, before entry, is located at the center of the product space. We
then do the same using the duopoly model for the various parameters of  and
2 In particular this occurs for  < 8=7 (Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999)).
3This happens when there are consumers who do not buy at all.
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the corresponding locations for the two rms. We compare the results in the
two models and show that post entry prices can not decrease. Also, there are
values of  for which the consumers surplus is greater before entry. We have
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 With linear transportation cost, the optimal price for the monopoly
that is located at x = 12 is an interior solution for   1. All consumers in
[ 12  V2t ; 12+ V2t ] buy. The monopolys price is V2 its prots are V
2
2t the consumers
surplus is V
2
4t and total welfare is
3V 2
4t .
When we have two rms and for 43    2, the price and the total prots
are V   t4 the consumers surplus is t8 and total welfare is V   t8 .
When we have two rms and for 87   < 43 , the price and the total prots
are t2 the consumers surplus is 4V   2V
2
t   7t4 and total welfare is 4V   2V
2
t   5t4 .
The proof is in the Appendix.
From above it is easy to show that post entry: (a) Prices increase4 and
(b) there are values of  for which competition can harm consumers as total
consumers surplus decreases. We have the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 For linear transportation cost, post entry: Prices increase for
8
7   < 2. Prices remain the same for  = 2. Consumers surplus decreases
for  2 ( 97 ;
p
2). Consumers surplus remains the same for  = 97 and  =
p
2.
The proof can be easily derived if we compare the prices and the consumers
surplus in the two models from Lemma 1 for the various values of  and can be
found in the Appendix.
We rst compare the consumers surplus of the monopoly with that of the
duopoly models when 87   < 43 . Notice that the ratio of the duopoly price
over the monopoly price t=2V=2 =  increases as  increase. On the other hand,
as  increases the monopoly sells to less consumers (the monopolys market
share is 12 +
V
2t   ( 12   V2t ) = 1 ). Recall that in the duopoly model, the two
rms always cover the whole market. As  increases, the e¤ect of higher prices
dominates the e¤ect of the increased variety on consumers surplus. As a result,
the consumers surplus is higher in the monopoly model for high values of 
(i.e. when  2 ( 97 ; 43 )).
We now compare the consumers surplus of the monopoly with that of the
duopoly models when 43    2. Here, the ratio of the prices in the two
models V 
t
4
V
2
= 2   2 decreases with . In addition, as  increases, as before,
the monopoly sells to less consumers. As a result, the consumers surplus is
higher in the monopoly model for low values of , i.e. when  2 [ 43 ;
p
2).
In Figures 1 and 2 we compare the consumers surplus when V = 2. For this
V the acceptable values of t in the two models are: t 2  167 ; 4 in the duopoly
model and t 2 [2;1) in the monopoly model. The two models can be compared
4The price remains the same when  = 2.
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for t 2 [2; 4] (recall that the two models can be compared for  2 [1; 2]). For
all vales of t the monopoly charges smaller prices (Figure 1). Furthermore, it is
clear that there are values of t for which the consumers surplus is higher in the
monopoly model. This happens for t 2   187 ; 2p2 (in the AB interval in Figure
2). Notice that for these values of t the di¤erence in the prices between the two
models (in Figure 1) is high. In Figure 3 we examine the consumers surplus
when  = 107 (with V = 2 and t =
20
7 ) for the consumers in [0; 1]. In such
case the monopoly serves only the consumers at the interval x 2  320 ; 1720 and
the consumers surplus is given by the area (FGK). On the other hand the two
rms in the duopoly model serve the whole market and the consumers surplus
is given by the area (CDH) plus the area (HJL). Although (a) all consumers buy
in the duopoly model and (b) both the consumers around x = 14 and around
x = 34 enjoy a high surplus the total consumers surplus in the duopoly is smaller
than the consumers surplus in monopoly (the area (EGIH) is greater than the
area (CDEF) plus the area (IJLK). This happens as the consumers around 12
enjoy a substantially higher surplus in the monopoly model.
1.2 Quadratic transportation cost
We now assume quadratic transportation cost. As before, the monopoly is
initially located at the center of the market.5 A consumer who buys from the
monopoly has utility:
U(x) = V   t

x  1
2
2
  PM ;
and consumers with nonnegative utility buy from the monopoly.
Post entry, the monopoly relocates and the market can again be described
by the standard duopoly model. The utility that a consumer who is located at
point x in the line gets from buying the product from A is:
UA(x) = V   t(x  xA)2   PA;
and the utility he gets when he buys from B is:
UB(x) = V   t(1  xB   x)2   PB :
A consumer located at x solves:
maxfV   t(x  xA)2   PA; V   t(1  xB   x)2   PB ; 0g:
We follow the analysis of Chrico et. al (2003) that give the various equilib-
rium locations for the two rms.6 For  2 [ 1620 ; 169 ] the two rms are located
at xA =
3
p
t 2pV+t
2
p
t
and 1   xB =   12 +
p
V+tp
t
and we have a competitive
5Notice that again this is the optimal location for the monopoly.
6Here, we modify the analysis of Chrico et. al (2003) for general t as in their analysis, they
assume t = 1.
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equilibrium with full supplytype of equilibrium. In fact, here, the consumers
at the endpoints of the product space enjoy a positive surplus and the consumer
at x = 12 does not enjoy a positive surplus.
7 For  2 [ 169 ; 163 ] the two rms
are located at the two quartiles and we have a touching equilibrium with full
supply, in which the consumers at x = 0; x = 1 and x = 12 have zero utility.
Finally, for  > 163 the two rms form two (local) monopolies.
We again consider values of  for which the optimal price of the monopoly
is an interior solution. This happens for   43 . We follow the analysis of the
previous section. We have the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 With quadratic transportation cost, the optimal price for the monopoly
that is located at x = 12 is an interior solution for   43 . In such case all con-
sumers in [ 12   Vp3ptV ; 12 + Vp3ptV ] buy. The monopolys price is 2V3 its prots
are 4V
2
3
p
3
p
tV
the consumers surplus is 4V
p
tV
9
p
3t
and total welfare is 16V
2
9
p
3
p
tV
.
When we have two rms and for 1620    169 ; the price and the total prots
are  2t+2ptpV + t, the consumers surplus is   12
p
t( 7
p
t
6  
p
V + t) and total
welfare is   31t12 + 52
p
t
p
V + t .
When we have two rms, for 169    163 the price and the total prots are
V   t16 the consumers surplus is t24 and total welfare is V   t48 .
The proof is in the Appendix. It is easy to prove the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 For quadratic transportation cost post entry: Prices increase for
4
3   < 163 . Prices remain the same for  = 163 . Consumers surplus decrease
for 43   < 8
3p2
3 . Consumers surplus remains the same for  =
8 3
p
2
3 .
The proof can be easily derived if we compare the prices and the consumers
surplus in the monopoly model with those in the duopoly models for 1612    169
and 169    163 and can be found in the Appendix.
First notice that the monopoly sells only to a 12+
Vp
3
p
tV
 ( 12  Vp3ptV ) = 2p3
mass of consumers around 12 . However, the monopoly price is smaller than the
price in the duopoly model for both types of equilibria.8 Although the consumers
who are located around xA and 1   xB enjoy a positive surplus this is much
smaller than the surplus that enjoy the consumers around the center before
entry. For this reason, the consumer surplus is greater in the monopoly, for low
values of .
In Figures 4, 5 we compare the consumers surplus when V = 2. For this V
the acceptable values for t are: t 2  3212 ; 322  in the duopoly model and t 2  3220 ;1
in the monopoly model. As the two models can be compared for  2 [ 1612 ; 163 ]
we compare them for 3212  t  323 . For all vales of t the monopoly charges
smaller prices (Figure 4). The consumers surplus is higher in the monopoly
model when t < 16
3p2
3 (in the interval ab in Figure 5). Notice that for these
7The above hold also for  2 [ 16
33
; 16
20
). However, in this range of , the two rms are
located outside of [0; 1], a possibility that we do not examine.
8The price remains the same when  = 16
3
.
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values of t the di¤erence between the prices in the two models is high. In Figure
6 we examine the consumers surplus when  = 166 (with V = 2 and t =
32
6 )
for the consumers in [0; 1]. In such case the monopoly serves only a mass of
p
2
2
consumers around the center of the characteristic space (the consumers surplus
is given by the area (edjk)). On the other hand the two rms in the duopoly
model serve the whole market (the consumers surplus is given by the area (cdh)
plus the area (hjl)). Although (a) all consumers buy in the duopoly model and
(b) both the consumers around x = 14 and around x =
3
4 enjoy a high surplus,
the total consumers surplus post entry is smaller (the area (dhj) is greater than
the area (cde) plus the area (kjl)). This happens as the consumers around 12
enjoy a substantially higher surplus in the monopoly model.
1.3 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. First notice that the monopoly maximizes its prots when it is
located at x = 12 . The monopoly charges price PM . All consumers located at
x such that V   tj 12   xj   PM  0 buy from the monopoly. For the marginal
consumer who buys from the monopoly and is located at x < 12 we have x =
2PM+t 2V
2t . Its prots are:
2PM (
1
2
  2PM + t  2V
2t
). (1)
The monopoly sets price PM = V2 to maximize its prots. From (1) the
monopolys prots are V
2
2t . The consumer at x =
1
2 has surplus V   V2 = V2 .
The marginal consumer is located at x = 12   V2t . The consumers surplus is
therefore 2( 12  V2  V2t ) = V
2
4t and total welfare is:
V 2
2t +
V 2
4t =
3V 2
4t . Notice that
the marginal consumer lies the interval [0; 1] for   1.
To analyze the duopoly it su¢ ces to examine rmA as we focus on symmetric
equilibria. Also, we do not examine the case where  2 (0; 87 ) as for that range
there is no pure strategy symmetric equilibrium in prices and locations. As
mentioned above, we do not consider the case where  2 (2;1) as for that
range the two rms form two local monopolies.
From Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999), for  2 [ 43 ; 2] we have: xA = 14
and the price A sets is PA = V   t4 . As the total market is covered, the total
prots for both rms are V   t4 . Notice that, rm A sells to all consumers
located at x  12 . The marginal consumers at x = 0 and x = 12 are indi¤erent
between buying and not buying. The consumer located at xA has surplus t4 .
As a result, we have that consumers surplus is 2( 12  t4  12 ) = t8 , total prots are
V   t4 and total welfare is V   t4 + t8 = V   t8 .
From Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999), for  2 [ 87 ; 43 ) we have: xA =
V
t   12 and the price A sets is PA = t2 . As the total market is covered, the
total prots for both rms are t2 . Notice that, rm A sells to all consumers
located at x  12 . The marginal consumers at x = 0 is indi¤erent between
buying and not buying. However, the consumer at x = 12 , who is indi¤erent
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from buying from either rm, has surplus 2V   3t2 . The consumer located
at xA has surplus V   t2 . As a result, we have that consumers surplus is
2(( 12  (V   t2 )  (Vt   12 )) + 12 (2V   3t2 + V   t2 )  ( 12   Vt + 12 )) = 4V   2V
2
t   7t4
and total welfare is 4V   2V 2t   5t4 .
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For  2 [ 87 ; 43 ) the price in the duopoly model is t2 and the price in
the monopoly model is V2 . As  =
t
V > 1, post entry the price increases.
For  2 [ 87 ; 43 ) the di¤erence in consumers surplus between the monopoly
and the duopoly models is:
V 2
4t
 

4V   2V
2
t
  7t
4

=  4V + 9V
2
4t
+
7t
4
:
The di¤erence is zero for t = V and t = 9V7 . Notice that the di¤erence is
positive for t > 9V7 as its derivative with respect to t, which is equal to
7
4   9V
2
4t2
is positive for t > 3Vp
7
and 3Vp
7
< 9V7 .
For  2 [ 43 ; 2] the price in the duopoly model is V   t4 . We have:
V   t
4
>
V
2
=) V
2
>
t
4
=)  < 2;
post entry the price increases, and only for  = 2 prices remain the same.
For  2 [ 43 ; 2] the di¤erence in consumers surplus between the monopoly
and the duopoly models is:
V 2
4t
  t
8
;
which is positive for  <
p
2, and zero for  =
p
2.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Proof. We now examine the monopoly at x = 12 model. The consumer at
x who buys from the monopolist who is located at x = 12 and charges price
PM has utility V   t
 
1
2   x
2   PM . The price PM is such that the marginal
consumer who is located at x has zero surplus. We therefore have: PM =
V  t   12   x2 =) x = 12  V PMt  12 and x = 12+ V PMt  12 . The monopolist
who is located at x = 12 maximizes its prots:
2PM
 
1
2
 
 
1
2
 

V   PM
t
 1
2
!!
:
From the rst order condition we have PM = 2V3 . We have x
 = 12   Vp3tV ;
x = 12+
Vp
3tV
. As we require 0  x  1 we also require V  3t4 =)   43 . The
prots are 4V
2
3
p
3
p
tV
. The consumer located at x who buys from the monopoly
has surplus: V   t( 12   x)2   2V3 . The consumers surplus is:Z 1
2+
Vp
3tV
1
2  Vp3tV

V   t(1
2
  x)2   2V
3

dx =
4V
p
tV
9
p
3t
;
9
and total welfare is 16V
2
9
p
3
p
tV
.
Following Chrico et. al (2003), when we have two rms, for 1620    169
the location of rm A is, xA =
3
p
t 2pV+t
2
p
t
and the location of B is: 1   xB =
  12 +
p
V+tp
t
. The price and the total prots are  2t+ 2ptpV + t. The surplus
of a consumer located at x who buys from A is:
V   t

x 

3
p
t  2pV + t
2
p
t
2
  ( 2t+ 2ptpV + t) =
 1
4
p
t( 1 + 2x)(4pV + t+pt( 5 + 2x)):
The consumers surplus is:
2
Z 1
2
0

 1
4
p
t( 1 + 2x)(4pV + t+pt( 5 + 2x))

dx =
 1
2
p
t

7
p
t
6
 pV + t

and total welfare is   31t12 + 52
p
t
p
V + t .
For 169   < 163 the price and the total prots are V   t16 . The consumer
located at x and buys form A has surplus
V   t

1
4
  x
2
 

V   t
16

=
1
2
t(1  2x)x;
and the total consumers surplus is
2
Z 1
2
0
1
2
t(1  2x)xdx = t
24
;
and total welfare is V   t16 + t24 = V   t48 .
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. For 1612    169 we rst compare the prices in the two models. We
have:
 2t+ 2ptpV + t > 2V
3
=) 2ptpV + t > 2V
3
+ 2t;
and we have:
t(V + t) >

V
3
+ t
2
=) tV
3
>
V 2
9
=) t
V
>
1
3
;
which holds as 1612  .
We now compare consumers surplus for the monopoly at x = 12 and the
duopoly at xA =
3
p
t 2pV+t
2
p
t
models. The di¤erence in the consumers surplus
is:
4V
p
tV
9
p
3t
 

 1
2
p
t

7
p
t
6
 pV + t

: (2)
10
Its derivative with respect to V is: 2V
3
p
3
p
tV
 
p
t
4
p
t+V
and is positive in this
interval as it is positive for the minimum value of V in the interval,9 that is for
V = 9t16 . We have
2V
3
p
3
p
tV
 
p
t
4
p
t+V
V= 9t16 =   15 + 12p3 > 0. It therefore su¢ ces
to show that the di¤erence is positive for V = 9t16 . This holds as for V =
9t
16 , (2)
is equal to 148 ( 2t+ 3
p
3t) > 0.
For 169    163 we rst compare the prices in the two models. We have:
V   t
16
>
2V
3
=) V
3
>
t
16
;
which holds as inequality for  < 163 and as equality when  =
16
3 .
We now compare consumers surplus for the monopoly at x = 12 and the
duopoly at the quartiles models. The di¤erence in the consumers surplus is:
4V
p
tV
9
p
3t
  t
24
:
First notice that 169    163 () 3t16  V  9t16 . The derivative of 4V
p
tV
9
p
3t
with
respect to V is: 2V
3
p
3
p
tV
and is positive. We have:
4V
p
tV
9
p
3t
  t
24
= 0 =) V = 3t
8 3
p
2
:
As 3t16 <
3t
8 3
p
2
< 9t16 the di¤erence is negative for V 2
h
3t
16 ;
3t
8 3
p
2

zero at 3t
8 3
p
2
and
positive for

3t
8 3
p
2
; 9t16
i
. In terms of , the di¤erence is positive for  2
h
16
9 ;
8 3
p
2
3

nd zero at  = 8
3p2
3 .
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